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Penggabungan dan pengambilalihan rentas sempadan (CBMA) dianggap 
pilihan mod mengantarabangsakan dengan keutamaan yang tinggi pada CBMA oleh 
firma-firma, khususnya dari negara anggota ASEAN. Walau bagaimanapun, isu 
kejayaan CBMA timbul disebabkan oleh kegagalan urus niaga yang tinggi dan 
penciptaan tanpa nilai oleh firma yang terlibat dengan CBMA. Keadaan ini 
mendorong kepada keperluan mengkaji penentu kejayaan CBMA. Ciri utama 
CBMA, iaitu urus niaga rentas negara boleh menjejaskan kejayaan CBMA 
disebabkan oleh ciri-ciri khusus sesebuah negara. Maka, kajian ini memilih untuk 
menumpukan perhatian kepada faktor-faktor khusus negara (iaitu tadbir urus 
korporat peringkat negara, ketidaktentuan kadar pertukaran, jarak budaya, jarak 
geografi dan tahap pembangunan ekonomi) sebagai penentu kejayaan CBMA. Kajian 
terhadap 246 CBMA yang melibatkan firma sasaran dan 348 CBMA firma pembida 
dari negara-negara anggota ASEAN mendedahkan kadar kejayaan CBMA bagi firma 
sasaran ASEAN adalah lebih tinggi berbanding firma pembida ASEAN. Prestasi 
berasaskan pasaran jangka panjang (Tobin’s Q) firma sasaran ASEAN bertambah 
baik selepas CBMA, manakala untuk firma pembida ASEAN, prestasi tersebut 
merosot. Bukti yang diperoleh dari analisa regresi adalah muktamad; bagi firma 
ASEAN, tadbir urus korporat peringkat negara boleh menjejaskan kejayaan CBMA. 
Pengambilalihan firma sasaran ASEAN oleh firma permbida dari negara yang 
mempunyai standard tadbir urus korporat yang lebih rendah boleh merisikokan 
kejayaan CBMA kesan daripada limpahan negatif. Sementara itu, bagi firma 
xvi 
pembida ASEAN, kemungkinan kejayaan CBMA meningkat melalui limpahan 
positif dengan syarat jurang tadbir urus adalah besar dan penyertaan pemilikan tidak 
terlalu tinggi. Tambahan pula, firma pembida ASEAN boleh meraih manfaat 
daripada bootstrapping dan juga meningkatkan kebarangkalian kejayaan CBMA 
dengan menggunakan saham sebagai pembayaran pembelian. Di samping itu, CBMA 
yang dijalankan dalam tempoh kadar pertukaran yang tidak menentu mampu 
meningkatkan kemungkinan kejayaan CBMA firma sasaran ASEAN. Sejajar dengan 
teori identiti sosial, jarak budaya yang luas antara firma pembida ASEAN dan firma 
sasarannya akan merendahkan peluang kejayaan CBMA. Terdapat bukti yang 
muktamad bahawa jarak fizikal antara negara firma sasaran dan pembida tidak 
memberi sebarang kesan yang signifikan terhadap kejayaan CBMA bagi kedua-dua 
firma sasaran dan pembida ASEAN. Akhir sekali, jika firma sasaran ASEAN 
diambilalih oleh firma pembida dari negara yang mempunyai tahap pembangunan 
ekonomi yang berbeza, nilai akan dicipta melalui gabungan sumber kedua-dua 
negara yang unik dan tidak dapat ditiru selaras dengan teori pandangan berdasarkan 
sumber. Implikasi theory utama oleh kajian ini adalah meluaskan hipotesis limpahan 
tadbir urus korporat dengan menonjolkan kepentingan jurang tadbir urus. 
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Cross-border mergers and acquisitions (CBMAs) are deemed the preferred 
internationalisation mode with a high preference towards CBMAs by firms, 
particularly from the ASEAN member countries. Nevertheless, the issue of CBMA 
success emerges due to high deal failure and non-value creation by firms involved in 
CBMAs. Thus, it impelled the needs to examine the determinants of CBMA success. 
The main characteristic of CBMA which is cross-country transaction could risk 
CBMA success due to country characteristics. Hence, this study chose to focus on 
the country-specific factors (i.e. country-level corporate governance, exchange rate 
volatility, cultural distance, geographic distance, and the level of economic 
development) as determinants of a CBMA success. The scrutinisation of 246 
CBMAs involving ASEAN target firms and 348 CBMAs comprising ASEAN 
bidding firms reveals that the CBMA success rate of ASEAN target firms is slightly 
higher than ASEAN bidding firms. The long-term market-based performance 
(Tobin’s Q) of ASEAN target firms improved following CBMA whereas for ASEAN 
bidding firms, the performance deteriorated. The result from multiple regression 
analysis was conclusive; country-level corporate governance could affect the success 
of CBMA for ASEAN firms. The acquisition of ASEAN target firm by a bidder from 
a country with inferior corporate governance standard could risk the CBMA success 
due to the negative spillover. Meanwhile, for ASEAN bidder, the possibility of 
CBMA success increases through positive spillover provided that the governance gap 
is large and the ownership participation is not too high. Additionally, ASEAN bidder 
could benefit from bootstrapping and also increase the possibility of CBMA success 
xviii 
by using shares as purchase consideration. Besides, CBMA conducted during the 
period of volatile exchange rate could increase the possibility of CBMA success for 
ASEAN target firms. Consistent with social identity theory, a large cultural distance 
between the ASEAN bidder and its target could result in a lower chance of CBMA 
success. There is conclusive evidence that the physical distance between the target 
and bidding country do not have any significant effect on the CBMA success for 
both ASEAN target and bidder firms. Finally, if the ASEAN target firms were 
acquired by a bidder from a country with a different level of economic development, 
the value is created from the pool of resources from both countries, which is unique 
and inimitable as per resource-based view theory. The main theoretical implication 
of this study is extending the corporate governance spillover hypothesis by 
highlighting the significance of the governance gap. 
1 
CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background of Study  
Cross-border mergers and acquisitions (CBMAs) is a popular choice for a firm’s 
external growth strategy. Similar to domestic mergers and acquisition (M&A), 
CBMA occurs when the buyers (bidding firms) acquire the assets or controlling 
interest of the sellers (target firms). However, CBMAs are transactions in which the 
bidder and target firms are residing in two different countries. Among the 
motivations for the bidding firm to acquire a target from a foreign country is to 
increase its market share by expanding the distribution channel to other countries. In 
addition, CBMA allows the bidding firm to internalise the target’s competitive 
advantages. Thus, CBMA has become a source of value creation for the combined 
firms.    
 
Due to the attractiveness of CBMAs in creating value for the firms involved, bidding 
firms are willing to spend a substantial amount of fund to finance the acquisition of a 
target firm. The primary attribute of CBMA, which is the country differences, 
escalate the cost of acquisition. This is due to the fact that a transaction between two 
different countries is subject to challenges such as information asymmetries because 
of the imperfection in the capital market. Thus, the increase in the acquisition cost 
will pose a great challenge to the value creation, hence the CBMA success. Despite 
the challenges in acquiring a target firm from a foreign country, CBMA is deemed 
the preferred mode of internationalisation, as proven by the statistic in the World 
Investment Report 2015 (UNCTAD, 2015). 
2 
CBMAs, with an increment of 28% in the year 2014, has regained its popularity as 
the preferred mode for international investment valuing at almost USD 400 billion 
(UNCTAD, 2015), after experiencing a decline for two consecutive years as depicted 
in Figure 1.1. Additionally, UNCTAD (2015) also reported that the increase in 
CBMA sales value in the year 2014 was contributed by an upsurge in the developing 
economies CBMA sales at 52% as compared to an increased in the developed 
countries CBMA sales (16%). It is also interesting to note that the increase in CBMA 
purchase of developing countries is equivalent to the increase in developed 




Figure 1.1 CBMA value by year 
Source: World Investment Report 2015 
 
Figure 1.2 clearly indicates that the largest share of CBMA sales value from 
developing economies is contributed by the Asian countries (74%) followed by Latin 
America and the Caribbean (21%), and Africa (4%). Similarly, the largest share of 
CBMA purchase value from developing economies is also contributed by the Asian 
countries (90%) followed by Latin America and the Caribbean (6%), and Africa 
3 
(4%), as portrayed in Figure 1.3. The statistics are consistent with the contention 
made by Jongwanich, Brooks, and Kohpaiboon (2013) that CBMAs from developing 




Figure 1.2 Percentage of CBMA sales value by developing region in the year 
2014 




Figure 1.3 Percentage of CBMA purchase value by developing region in the year 
2014 
Source: World Investment Report 2015 
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Additionally, Figure 1.2 and Figure 1.3 also indicate that the East Asian countries are 
the main contributor of CBMA sales and purchase in the Asian nation with more 
than half of CBMAs in this region are from the East Asian countries. With China 
being a major part of the East Asian region, it is not surprising that the East Asian 
countries dominated CBMAs in Asia because China currently has overtaken Japan as 
the world second largest stock market (Johnson, 2014). With a 6% share of the Asian 
nation’s CBMA sales, the firms from the countries of Association Southeast Asian 
Nation (afterwards addressed as ASEAN) recorded an increase of 17%, to USD 7.5 
billion for CBMA after experiencing a decrease for two consecutive years, which is 
consistent with the worldwide CBMA trend (Figure 1.1). Similarly, CBMA purchase 
also recorded an increase for five consecutive years. This increase supports the 
argument made by Metwalli and Tang (2009) that CBMA involving ASEAN 
countries would experience expansion as a result of numerous bilateral and regional 
free trade agreements in this region.  
 
Furthermore, the upsurging of CBMAs involving ASEAN countries is also 
contributed by the regional integration through the establishment of ASEAN 
Economic Community (AEC) (The ASEAN Secretariat & UNCTAD, 2015). This is 
because one of the objectives of the AEC Blueprint (2015) is to attract foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and to sustain the flow of new investment and reinvestment (The 
ASEAN Secretariat, 2008). As a result, ASEAN Comprehensive Investment 
Agreement (ACIA) was introduced, which contributed to a better investment climate 
in the region and ultimately resulted in the increase of CBMAs (both sales and 
purchase) in the ASEAN region.  
 
5 
1.2 Problem Statement 
With the perpetual preference of using CBMA as an external growth strategy, the 
worldwide merger and acquisition (M&A) deal failure in the year 2014 was upsetting 
as it reaches the highest level since 2008 (Massoudi, 2014). Figure 1.4 shows that the 
percentage of completed M&A deals worldwide was on a declining trend. In 
addition, data by Thomson One Banker indicate that in the year 2015, the highest 
CBMAs deals failure were from the Asia Pacific region with only 51% of the deals 




Figure 1.4 Percentage of completed M&A deals by year 
Source: Thomson One Banker 
 
Table 1.1 The percentage of completed number of deals by bidder primary nation 
region 
Bidder Primary Nation Region Number of Deals 
Announced 
Number of Deals 
Completed 
% of Completed 
Deals 
Americas 13,148 11,173 85% 
Asia-Pacific (ex-Central Asia) 11,063   5,628 51% 
Europe 14,248 12,054 85% 
Japan   2,576   1,655 64% 
Africa/ Middle East/ Central Asia   1,065 732 69% 
Source: Thomson One Banker (2016) 
 
6 
The fact that one-third of M&A activity in the Asia Pacific region for the first half of 
the year 2014 took place in ASEAN (Yang, 2014), the M&A failure was also 
experienced by ASEAN firms as numerous CBMA deals involving ASEAN firms 
were withdrawn. Table 1.2 shows the list of top ten failed CBMAs involving 
ASEAN firms according to the value of transaction that was withdrawn. For 
instance, a deal worth USD 8.3 billion between Singapore Exchange Ltd (SGX) and 
ASX Ltd (ASX) was withdrawn in 2010. While in 2014, a Thailand’s firm, Thai 
Union Frozen PLC withdrew its agreement to acquire the entire share capital of 
Bumble Bee Foods LLC that was worth USD 1.5 billion.  
 














Singapore ASX Ltd Australia 8,304.69 
2/4/2012 DBS Group 
Holdings Ltd 
Singapore Bank Danamon Tbk 
PT 
Indonesia 4,970.47 
2/5/2007 Rowsley Ltd Singapore Perfect Field 
Investment Inc 
China 3,481.06 
15/11/2012 Kirin Holdings Co 
Ltd 
Japan Fraser & Neave-
Food & Beverage 
Singapore 2,207.51 
2/9/2003 Investor Group Malaysia Loy Yang Power 
Plant & Coal 
Australia 2,203.50 
19/12/2014 Thai Union Frozen 
Products PCL 









Dynamic Event Ltd Indonesia 1,377.85 
2/9/2007 Investor Group Singapore China Estn Airlines 
Corp Ltd 
China 923.83 
7/8/2014 Berli Jucker PCL Thailand Metro Cash & 
Carry Vietnam Co 
Vietnam 875.20 
27/1/2012 United Fiber 
System Ltd 
Singapore Golden Energy 
Mines Tbk PT 
Indonesia 845.15 
Source: Thomson One Banker (2016) 
 
In addition, Froese (2010) revealed that more than 50% of CBMA failed to create 
value. Deal failure would result in the adversarial impact on both the firms (target or 
bidder) and the country as a whole. Hence, Massoudi (2014) claimed that the equity 
capital market would adversely react following M&A deal failure. Case in point, PT 
7 
Bank Danamon, a target bank from Indonesia (an ASEAN member country) reported 
a 14% decline in its share price following an M&A deal failure with DBS Group 
Holdings (bidder) from Singapore (Suhartono & Chatterjee, 2013). Obviously, M&A 
deal failure is detrimental to the financial health, especially for the target firm. 
Moreover, the failure of M&A deal would also slacken a country’s economic 
development as per the study by Appadu, Faelten, Moeller, and Vitkova (2014) and 
(Smimou, 2015), who asserted that M&A contributed to the economic development. 
The impact would be even greater for the ASEAN economies since a large portion of 
CBMAs involved the ASEAN countries as numerous withdrawn CBMAs worth 
billions of USD was recorded (Table 1.2).  
 
The alarming rate of M&A failure and the contribution of CBMA success towards 
economic development has led to the publication of a considerable amount of 
literature on the determinants of CBMA success. A successful deal is not only 
reflected by the completion of the deal but also when the deal generates value for the 
firm. The previous research works normally examined the shareholders’ value 
creation before they explored the determinants as measures for the CBMA success. 
Numerous earlier literature (Aybar & Thanakijsombat, 2015; Bae, Chang, & Kim, 
2013; Bhagat, Malhotra, & Zhu, 2011; Dang & Henry, 2015; Du & Boateng, 2015; 
Faelten, Gietzmann, & Vitkova, 2014; Jory & Ngo, 2011; Martynova & Renneboog, 
2008; Masulis, Wang, & Xie, 2012; Ning, Kuo, Strange, & Wang, 2014; Rani, 
Yadav, & Jain, 2014b; Sharma & Raat, 2015; Smimou, 2015; Starks & Wei, 2013; 
Wu, Yang, Yang, & Lei, 2016; M. Yang, 2015) focused on the short-term wealth 
effect of the shareholders (target or bidder) by examining the abnormal return 
surrounding the announcement date of CBMAs. Thus far, the firm’s long-term 
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market-based performance as a measure for CBMA success was allotted little 
attention (Basuil, 2011; Chakrabarti, Gupta-mukherjee, & Jayaraman, 2009; Dutta, 
Saadi, & Zhu, 2013; Faelten et al., 2014; Kedia & Reddy, 2015; Song, Kueh, Abdul 
Rahman, & Chu, 2010b). Therefore, more research is required to better understand 
the firm’s long-term market-based performance as an indicator of the CBMA 
success.  
 
With regard to the determinants of CBMA success, many factors have been 
examined such as firm-specific factors, deal characteristic factors, and country-
specific factors. Recently, there is a considerable amount of literature on the role of 
country-specific factors as the determinants of post-CBMAs firms’ performance. For 
CBMA, country-specific factors are more prevalent in explaining the variation in 
value creation. This is because there are risks associated with cross-border 
transaction such as governance difference, cultural difference, and geographic 
distance as highlighted by Koerniadi, Krishnamurti, and Tourani-Rad (2015) and 
Lobo, Paugam, and Stolowy (2015). Danbolt and Maciver (2012) claimed that 
CBMA is riskier than domestic M&A with a greater potential of valuation error, 
especially when there is volatility in the exchange rate, which is also a country-
specific factor. Additionally, Caiazza and Pozzolo (2016) asserted that a country’s 
economic development level affect the efficiency of the market for corporate control. 
Chang, Choi, and Huang (2015) stressed that country-specific factors are an 
important element in explaining the CBMA outcomes (such as whether CBMA is 
successful or unsuccessful). Therefore, it is interesting to extend the existing 




Other than the risk associated with cross-border transaction, examining the country-
specific factors impact on CBMA success is crucial for CBMA involving emerging 
market such as ASEAN countries. This is due to the features of emerging market 
such as less establish institutional environment (Boubakri, Cosset, & Guedhami, 
2005; Grigorieva & Petrunina, 2015), greater cultural differences (Smimou, 2015), 
unstable political environment (Yen, Chou, & André, 2013), and poor corporate 
governance (Lebedev, Peng, Xie, & Stevens, 2015; Yen et al., 2013). All these 
features may result in high information asymmetry and escalate the CBMA’s 
transaction cost (for due diligence process and post-CBMA integration) of emerging 
countries (Lebedev et al., 2015).  
 
This issue is even more severe in ASEAN countries. According to Yokotaki and 
Kashijuku (2015), the difficulty percentage of getting reliable information from 
ASEAN countries is the highest (27%), surpassing India (17%) or China (14%), thus, 
explaining the numerous deal failures involving ASEAN firms as stipulated in Table 
1.2. Despite the importance of country-specific factors in explaining CBMA success, 
there remains a scarcity of evidence in this area. Therefore, examining the impact of 
country-specific factors as the determinant of CBMA success for ASEAN firms 
would address the lack of research in this particular domain. 
 
Thus far, only a few studies (Bhagat et al., 2011; Martynova & Renneboog, 2008; 
Thenmozhi & Narayanan, 2016) examined country-specific corporate governance as 
a source of synergy that resulted in CBMA success. Grounded in corporate 
governance spillover, the studies indicated that the difference in corporate 
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governance between the target and bidding firm’s countries is a channel to generate 
value during CBMAs. The value generation stems from the spillover of a better 
corporate governance standard from the bidder to the target firm, which resulted in 
the improvement of the target firm’s corporate governance standard (positive 
spillover hypothesis) or from the bidder’s improvement in its corporate governance 
standard by bootstrapping itself to the target’s better corporate governance standard 
(bootstrapping hypothesis).  
 
Martynova and Renneboog (2008) also claimed that there is an upward trend of 
CBMA transactions in which the bidding firms are from countries with weak 
corporate governance and the target firms are from countries with strong corporate 
governance, thus adhering to the bootstrapping hypothesis. A similar pattern was also 
observed in ASEAN CBMAs. Bhagat et al. (2011) reported that for the bidding firms 
from ASEAN member countries (Malaysia and Philippines), the majority of their top 
targets firms were from developed countries with a higher governance score. 
Additionally, for the target firms from ASEAN member countries, the majority of 
their top bidders were from developed countries with a higher governance score 
(Song et al., 2010b). Therefore, these findings imply the probable contribution of 
country-level corporate governance in ensuring CBMA success among the ASEAN 
firms. 
 
With a high M&A failure rate in the Asia-Pacific region, a study on the role of 
country-level corporate governance in ensuring the CBMA success for ASEAN firms 
will shed light on how this country-specific factor contribute to the positive outcome. 
In fact, Carline, Linn and Yadav (2009) claimed that less attention was given to the 
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direct impact of corporate governance on the post-merger operating performance. 
Even though the study by Martynova and Renneboog (2008) presented evidence on 
the governance spillover for the European countries, the vagueness of governance 
spillover effect on emerging market such as ASEAN countries still exists. 
Furthermore, Claessens and Yurtoglu (2013) highlighted that studies on corporate 
governance in emerging market were mostly conducted at the firm-level, which 
focused on the role of corporate governance in matters related to financing, the cost 
of capital, valuation, and performance. There are very few studies on emerging 
market that focused on the role of country-level corporate governance in CBMAs 
(Bhagat et al., 2011). Additionally, Claessens and Yurtoglu (2013) recognised the 
importance of the internationalisation impact on corporate governance improvement 
through corporate governance convergence. The authors also stated that little is 
known about the mechanism that could drive corporate governance convergence 
such as CBMAs. 
 
Additionally, Martynova and Renneboog (2008) claimed that the share payment and 
low ownership participation (less than 100% ownership) could result in a stronger 
bootstrapping valuation effect. They asserted that the acceptance of shares by the 
target shareholders would lead to resistance in adopting the bidder poor governance 
standard and the ownership participation of less than 100% would allow the target to 
be listed on its’ country stock exchange. Both situations could increase the possibility 
of bootstrapping occurrence. Furthermore, the high ownership participation and 
payment other than share would also facilitate the execution of market for corporate 
through positive spillover due to high voting power and the absence of resistance 
from target shareholders, respectively. Therefore, these two deal characteristic 
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factors (share payment and ownership participation) could moderate the relationship 
between country-level corporate governance and the CBMA success. 
 
Beside country-level corporate governance, the exchange rate is also an important 
country-specific factor in explaining the success of a CBMA involving ASEAN 
firms. This is due to the fact that it is more difficult to value the target in foreign 
market than domestic market when there is high exchange rate volatility and hence 
could result in valuation error (Danbolt & Maciver, 2012); Brown (2016) claimed 
that volatility of ASEAN countries exchange rate has become a great challenge for 
investors who seek to invest in ASEAN countries. A valuation error would be 
detrimental to the success of a CBMA deal. In other words, this fact denotes that the 
exchange rate volatility could decidedly affect the success of CBMA deals involving 
ASEAN firms.  
 
However, there are debates whether exchange rate could positively affect CBMA 
success (Boateng, Hua, Uddin, & Du, 2014; Gregory & O’Donohoe, 2014; Harris & 
Ravenscraft, 1991; Starks & Wei, 2013) or leave no significant impact on the success 
of CBMAs  (Cakici, Hessel, & Tandon, 1996; Danbolt & Maciver, 2012; 
Georgopoulos, 2008; Jongwanich et al., 2013). Furthermore, except for a study by 
Jongwanich et al. (2013), the uncertainness of the exchange rate role for the CBMA 
success in emerging market (such as ASEAN) still exist because the previous studies 
focused on developed countries (such as the United States and the United Kingdom). 
Thus, a study on the role of a country’s exchange rate in CBMA success will 
highlight the contribution of another country-specific factor (exchange rate) in 
ensuring the success of CBMA. 
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Other than the exchange rate volatility, risk associated with cross-border transaction 
also stems from cultural differences (Koerniadi et al., 2015; Lobo et al., 2015) and 
cultural differences are more prevalent in emerging countries (Smimou, 2015) such 
as ASEAN countries. Cultural differences increase the risk of unsuccessful CBMA 
by complicating the post-CBMA integration process (Cartwright & Cooper, 1995; 
Duncan & Mtar, 2006) and causing a high information asymmetry (Dutta et al., 
2013). Yokotaki and Kashijuku (2015) claimed that the post-CBMA integration is 
crucial for the success of a CBMA deal. Thus, it is essential to examine whether or 
not cultural differences are the deterrent factor of CBMA success involving ASEAN 
countries.  
 
Another important source of risk associated with the cross-border transaction is 
geographic distance (Koerniadi et al., 2015; Lobo et al., 2015). Among the reasons 
for the adverse impact of geographic distance are immense monitoring cost 
(Jongwanich et al., 2013), high information asymmetry (Dutta et al., 2013; Punurai, 
2014), and low level of trust between the two parties involved (Martynova & 
Renneboog, 2008). The adverse impacts of geographic distance decrease the 
probability of CBMA success. A small geographic distance is crucial for the success 
of CBMA deals, especially for ASEAN firms as the small geographic distance will 
promote CBMA within the ASEAN region (The ASEAN Secretariat & UNCTAD, 
2015). Hence, the investigation on the role of geographic distance in ensuring a 
CBMA success is crucial for the ASEAN firms.  
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Last but not least, since the majority of ASEAN member countries are classified as 
emerging economy, there is a high risk of an inefficient market for corporate control 
that could lead to CBMA failure (Caiazza & Pozzolo, 2016). Accordingly, it is 
crucial for a CBMA transaction involving ASEAN firms to acquire or being acquired 
by firms from a developed country. Therefore, it is vital to examine how the 
involvement of firms from different countries development level in ASEAN CBMA 
could affect the probability of CBMA success. Hence, this study aims at examining 
the role of country-specific factors as the determinants of CBMA success. 
 
1.3 Objectives of Study 
The main objective of this study is to investigate the role of country-specific factors 
as the determinants of CBMA success whilst the three specific objectives are: 
1. To examine the success of ASEAN firms’ CBMA 
2. To investigate the role of country-specific factors in ASEAN firms’ CBMA 
success 
3. To determine whether the relationship between country-specific factor 
(country-level corporate governance) and ASEAN firms’ CBMA success 
contingent upon the deal characteristic factors (ownership participation and 
share payment) 
 
1.4 Research Questions 
This study aims to answer the following research questions: 
1. Do CBMAs involving ASEAN firms are successful CBMA? 
2. Are country-specific factors vital to the CBMA success that involves 
ASEAN firms? 
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3. Is the relationship between the country-specific factor (country-level 
corporate governance) and ASEAN firms’ CBMA success contingent on the 
deal characteristic factors (share payment and ownership participation)? 
 
1.5 Significance of Study 
This study made two essential original contributions, namely to the CBMA literature 
(theoretical contributions) and to the practitioners who are directly involved in the 
CBMA (practical contributions) event. 
 
1.5.1 Theoretical contributions 
Theoretically, this study offered valuable insight as to whether the CBMAs 
undertaken by firms from ASEAN as either target or bidder is grounded on 
shareholder wealth maximisation theory or non-value maximisation theory. This is 
because the examination of CBMA success proxies by the changes in the firms’ 
performance indicated whether or not there is value creation as a result of the 
CBMA. The improvement in the firms’ performance following CBMA indicated a 
value creation, consistent with the shareholder wealth maximisation theory. In 
contrast, deterioration in the firms’ performance following CBMA indicated an 
absence of value creation as per non-value maximisation theory. 
 
In addition, this study offered a new insight into the existing research, which mainly 
focused on the firm-specific factors (size, type of business, top management 
characteristic, ownership, firm age) and deal characteristic factors (transaction size, 
relatedness, methods of payment, target public status). This study provided an 
exciting opportunity to advance our knowledge of how the country-level factors, 
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such as country-level corporate governance standard, exchange rate, cultural 
distance, geographic distance, and level of economic development act as the channels 
to influence the success of CBMAs.  
 
Furthermore, a study that focuses on the country-level corporate governance standard 
provided a more definitive answer whether an acquisition by firms from two 
countries with different corporate governance standard could collaborate and 
ultimately lead to CBMA success. This study was built upon the growing literature 
of corporate governance spillover hypothesis proposed by Martynova and 
Renneboog (2008) that CBMAs create value by improving either the target or bidder 
corporate governance standard. The study ascertained whether this hypothesis is 
relevant in the emerging market environment such as ASEAN member countries. 
Additionally, the examination of two deal characteristic factors (ownership 
participation and share payment) as moderator in corporate governance hypothesis 
shed a new insight on how the spillover of corporate governance effect on the 
success of the CBMA could be strengthen or weaken. Additionally, a positive effect 
of corporate governance spillover indicates that it is a source of synergy under 
shareholder wealth maximisation theory. 
 
This study also highlighted the importance of other country-specific factors 
(exchange rate, cultural distance, geographic distance, level of economic 
development) in determining the success of CBMA, especially in emerging market 
environment such as the ASEAN countries. The reason for this is because on top of 
the risks related to cross-border deals, the features of emerging market (high 
information asymmetry, a less establish corporate governance) would also be 
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detrimental to the success of CBMA involving ASEAN firms. Thus, this study 
complemented the current CBMA literature, which mostly involved studies in 
developed countries.   
  
1.5.2 Practical contributions 
From a practitioner point of view, this study provided an important opportunity for 
the management of a firm to comprehend better on how a firm from a country with 
poor corporate governance standard is able to create value and successfully acquire a 
firm from a country with better corporate governance standard. The study highlights 
the appropriate corporate governance gap for the bidder to bootstrap itself to a higher 
corporate governance standard of the target’s country. Thus, enabling the 
management of the firm to assess the readiness of a firm from a country with poor 
corporate governance standard to acquire a firm from a country with a better 
corporate governance standard. 
 
Furthermore, it is crucial to improve the attractiveness of ASEAN member countries 
as a platform for global investment, as highlighted in the ASEAN Economic 
Community (AEC) Blueprint 2025 (The ASEAN Secretariat, 2015). Thus, from the 
policymakers’ point of view, certain measures are required to maintain some level of 
the country corporate governance standard. This circumstance will attract CBMAs 
investment and improve the probability of CBMAs success. This study is vital, 
especially in determining the minimum level of country-corporate governance 
required for the spillover of corporate governance to materialise, which will lead to a 
successful CBMA.  
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1.6 Scope of Study 
This study focuses on cross-border mergers and acquisition (CBMAs), thus, 
domestic M&A will be excluded. The sample of this study will be specifically drawn 
from the CBMA transactions involving either ASEAN target or ASEAN bidding 
firms that are public listed companies. 
 
1.7 Definition of Key Terms 
1.7.1 Cross-border mergers and acquisitions (CBMAs) 
Cross-border mergers and acquisitions (CBMAs) is simply defined by Changqi and 
Ningling (2010) as an acquisition of asset or shares of a firm located in foreign 
countries.  CBMA also means that the two firms belong to two different nations or 
home countries (Reddy, 2015) and economies (Chen & Findlay, 2003). CBMA is 
also viewed as a mode of foreign direct investment (Ahouansou, 2010; Alba, Park, & 
Wang, 2009; Hopkins, 1999; Mody & Negishi, 2000; Nicolas, Santis, & Aviat, 2009; 
M. Wang & Wong, 2009; M. Yang, 2015; Zhu & Jog, 2012) as well as a greenfield 
investment in foreign countries. In this study, the term “CBMA” indicates a 
transaction involving the acquisition of net asset or shares between two firms from 
two different countries. Following the acquisition, both target and bidder still exist. 
 
1.7.2 Bidding firm 
The term bidding firm in this study refers to the buyer or acquirer firm (Whitaker, 
2016) and also the party who paid for the CBMA.  
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1.7.3 Target firm 
The target firm in this study denotes the seller or acquired firm (Whitaker, 2016) that 
received the consideration paid by the bidding firm. 
 
1.7.4 ASEAN 
The term ASEAN means the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, which was 
established on August 8, 1967 in Bangkok, Thailand. Initially, there were five 
ASEAN member countries, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and 
Thailand (The ASEAN Secretariat, 2016). Subsequently, five other countries joined 
the establishment, which brought the total number of members to ten. These five 
countries are Brunei (1984), Vietnam (1995), Laos (1997), Myanmar (1997), and 
Cambodia (1999). However, in this study, only six ASEAN member countries 
(Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam) is studied due 
to their active participation in CBMA compared to the other ASEAN member 
countries. 
 
1.7.5 CBMA Success 
In this study, a CBMA transaction is considered as a successful CBMA when it met 
two criteria. First, the CBMA transaction is completed. Second, the CBMA 
transaction created value for the firms (either the target or bidding firm) through the 
firm’s performance improvement following CBMA as opposed to before CBMA. 
 
1.7.6 Country-specific factors 
Country-specific factors indicate factors related to a country characteristic of either 
the target or bidding firms. Specifically, in this study, country-specific factors refer 
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to the country-level corporate governance, exchange rate volatility, cultural distance, 
geographic distance, and the level of economic development. 
 
The country-level corporate governance is defined as the level of corporate 
governance standard of country based on Country’s Governance indicator which is 
extracted from World Governance Indicator (WGI) Index. This index was developed 
by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2011). 
 
In this study, exchange rate volatility refers to the degree of variation of bidding 
country currency relative to the target country. Meanwhile, cultural distance is 
defined as the difference in culture between bidding country and target country. 
Geographic distance refers to the physical distance between bidding country and 
target country. Lastly, the level of economic development refers to the country 
classification based on FTSE country classification.   
 
1.7.7 Deal characteristic factors 
Deal characteristic factors refer to factors related to the characteristic of CBMA deal 
itself. For instance, in this study, the deal characteristic factors encompass the 
method of payment, ownership participation, transaction size, advisors, and 
relatedness. 
 
Method of payment refers to the consideration used by the bidding firms to pay for 
the acquisition. Ownership participation is the percentage of shares owned by the 
bidding firm in the target firm following CBMA transaction. Transaction size refers 
to the size of the acquisition. Advisor is defined as whether the bidding firms 
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appointed any advisors for the CBMA transaction. Lastly, relatedness indicate 
whether a CBMA transaction occur between firms from related industry or vice 
versa.  
 
1.7.8  Firm-specific factors 
Firm-specific factors refer to factors related to the target or bidding firm’s 
characteristics. Specifically, in this study, the firm-specific factors denote the firm 
size, firm’s leverage, and firm’s pre-acquisition performance. 
  
1.8 Organisation of the Thesis 
This thesis comprises six chapters. The current chapter introduces the background of 
the study as well as its objectives and significance. Chapter 2 reviews the CBMA 
literature and its theoretical aspects. The development of the hypotheses and 
theoretical framework are presented in Chapter 3 whilst the research methodology 
employed by this study is explicated in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 provides the results of 
data analysis. Finally, Chapter 6 presents the discussions on the findings, the 
conclusion, contributions, and limitation of this study as well as several suggestions 
for future research.   
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CHAPTER 2  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a review of the literature covering two main aspects of CBMA, 
namely the firms’ performance surrounding the CBMA event and the determinants of 
firms’ performance. Nevertheless, before reviewing the literature, Section 2.2 
discusses the theories underlying the motives for CBMAs and how it relates to the 
classical motives of mergers and acquisitions (M&As). This section also highlights 
the theories related to the determinants of the value creation in CBMA as reflected 
by the firm’s performance. Section 2.3 provides the empirical evidence of the firm’s 
performance in CBMA according to the previous literature. Section 2.4 outlines the 
previous studies on the determinants of firm’s performance in CBMA based on three 
broad categories (country-specific factors, deal characteristic factors, and firm-
specific factors). Section 2.5 summarises this chapter.     
 
2.2 Theoretical Overview of CBMAs 
This section discusses the theories related to the motives of CBMAs and how it 
relates to the classical theories of domestic mergers and acquisitions (M&As). Then 
it is followed by the discussion on theories underlying the determinants of the firms’ 
performance following CBMA. 
 
A firm’s decision to pursue M&A (either domestic or cross-border) is grounded on 
various theoretical motives. For the domestic M&As, Mat Nor (2003) asserted that 
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there are two main classical theories for M&As and they are shareholder wealth 
maximisation and non-value maximisation.  
 
According to shareholder wealth maximisation theory, M&A should maximise 
shareholders’ wealth by creating synergy and add value to both the bidding and 
target firms. The value creation would be reflected in the post-acquisition 
performance. Various theories had been listed as foundations for synergy creation 
such as efficiency theory, coinsurance effect theory, merger and debt capacity theory, 
tax benefit theory, agency theory, asymmetric information theory and monopolistic 
theory. For instance, according to efficiency theory M&A is executed to achieve 
synergy from financial, operational and managerial perspectives (Mat Nor, 2003). 
 
In contrast, according to non-value maximisation theory, M&A would not maximise 
the shareholders’ value because it is attempted to benefit the management of the 
firms. For instance, an increase in the firms’ size following M&A would result in an 
increase in the remuneration of the management. Hence, according to this theory, the 
firms’ performance will deteriorate following M&As.  
 
For CBMAs, Morresi and Pezzi (2014) claimed that there are three (3) main motives 
behind a firms’ decision for CBMAs. They are strategic reasons, external shock, and 
personal reasons. The first motive which is strategic reason for CBMA is closely 
related to the wealth maximisation theory because one of the strategic reasons for 
CBMAs is to create synergy. One of the sources of synergy creation is through the 
cost reduction. Cost reduction could be achieved through the internalisation of target 
firms’ resources and improvement in corporate governance.  
24 
 
Corhay and Rad (2000), Basuil (2011), and Du and Boateng (2015) argued based on 
the internalisation theory and claimed that cost reduction could be achieved in 
CBMAs by internalising the resources of the target firm or host countries. According 
to foreign direct investment theory, firms normally decided to invest abroad due to 
market imperfection. Hence, the internalisation of resources could reduce the 
transaction cost which resulted from market imperfection and consequently creating 
synergy through increasing the firms’ profitability. The increase in firms’ 
profitability will maximise shareholders’ wealth as it indicates an improvement in the 
firms’ performance following CBMAs. 
 
The internalisation theory is parallel to Eclectic Framework by Dunning (1980) who 
set forth three reasons for international production, namely ownership, location and 
internalisation. It is the “internalisation” element that attracts researchers most to the 
CBMAs literature because internalisation of target-specific resources is faster than 
setting up a new firm (Chen & Findlay, 2003). Accordingly, the bidding firms seek 
to internalise target firms ownership-specific advantages, such as technology, raw 
material, financial capital or distribution channel (Changqi & Ningling, 2010; 
Gonzalez, Vasconcellos, Kish, & Kramer, 1997; Popli & Sinha, 2014). The 
internalisation of these resources would result in cost reduction as it would be 
otherwise costly to obtain due to an inefficient market. Ultimately, this would 
improve the performance of the firms in CBMAs and hence maximising the 
shareholders’ wealth. 
 
